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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge.** 
 
Rabb Muhammad was convicted for failure to appear for 
trial in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 3146.1 On appeal, he 
contends that the district court improperly applied the 
relevant guideline provision, U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6 (1995). That 
guideline sets a base offense level for failure to appear, see 
S 2J1.6(a)(2), which is then increased in relation to the 
maximum penalty for the offense for which the defendant 
failed to appear. See S 2J1.6(b)(2)(A) (nine level increase if 
underlying offense punishable by death or fifteen or more 
years imprisonment); S 2J1.6(b)(2)(B) (six level increase if 
underlying offense is punishable by five to fifteen years 
imprisonment). At the time he fled, Muhammad had been 
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). Although this offense is 
typically punishable by a maximum of ten years in prison, 
see 18 U.S.C. S 924(a)(2), the penalty is escalated to a 
fifteen year minimum where the defendant's criminal 
history is particularly egregious, see 18 U.S.C. S 924(e). 
 
Since Muhammad's underlying offense was punishable 
by two different penalty provisions depending upon his 
criminal history, an argument arose at sentencing as to 
which provision Muhammad faced when he jumped bail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
** Honorable Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Third Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
 
1. Muhammad was sentenced to 51 months imprisonment, followed by 
three years supervised release. 
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Resolution of this question had great practical significance 
for Muhammad since it meant the difference between a six 
or nine level enhancement under S 2J1.6(b)(2). Rejecting 
Muhammad's continuing objection that only a six-level 
enhancement was proper under S 2J1.6(b)(2)(B), the district 
court ruled that the fact that Muhammad's indictment 
referenced 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) constituted notice to 
Muhammad at the time he jumped bail of the government's 
intent to seek a punishment of at least fifteen years if he 
was convicted under S 922(g)(1), and, on that basis, 
elevated Muhammad's base offense level by nine points 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6(b)(2)(A). 
 
We conclude that the district court correctly enhanced 
Muhammad's base offense level under S 2J1.6(b)(2), and 
adopt, with explanation, the "notice based" approach that it 
employed in reaching this conclusion. In addition, 
Muhammad contends that the district court erred in failing 
to reduce his offense level based on "acceptance of 
responsibility." Since we find no clear error in the district 
court's determination that this reduction should not apply, 
we reject that argument as well. 
 
I. 
 
On November 27, 1995, a federal grand jury returned a 
two-count indictment against Muhammad. Relevant to this 
appeal is the first count, which charged Muhammad with 
possession of a firearm and ammunition which had traveled 
in interstate commerce while having been previously 
convicted of at least three violent felonies or serious drug 
offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) and 924(e).2 Section 
922(g)(1) is a substantive firearms offense, which makes it 
unlawful for a person who has been convicted of a crime 
punishable by a term exceeding one year to possess a 
firearm. Section 922(g)(1) does not contain its own penalty 
provision; to find the punishment associated with violating 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Count two charged Muhammad with knowingly possessing a firearm 
which had been transported in interstate commerce and which had the 
manufacturer's serial number obliterated, altered or removed, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(k). 
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the section, as we must here, one looks to 18 U.S.C. 
SS 924(a)(2) and S 924(e). Section 924(a)(2) provides that a 
violation of S 922(g)(1) is punishable by up to ten years in 
prison, but under S 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act, 
that penalty is increased to a minimum of fifteen years 
imprisonment if the defendant has three previous 
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. See 
18 U.S.C. S 924(e)(1). In the instant case, the government 
believed that the S 924(e) enhancement was applicable to 
Muhammad and specifically referenced that provision in the 
indictment along with a list of the seven previous felony 
convictions that it believed qualified Muhammad for 
enhanced sentencing. 
 
At his arraignment, Muhammad pleaded not guilty to all 
counts, and on December 13, 1995, the district court held 
a bail hearing, after which Muhammad was released on a 
$20,000 surety bond, subject to twenty-four hour house 
arrest and electronic monitoring. Muhammad subsequently 
failed to appear for his scheduled trial. When a pretrial 
services officer went to Muhammad's residence, he 
discovered that Muhammad's electronic monitoring device 
had been cut and that Muhammad was missing. Two weeks 
later, Muhammad was arrested by the FBI at a Newark, 
New Jersey boarding house. The grand jury subsequently 
returned a superseding indictment charging Muhammad 
with the original two counts plus an additional count for 
failure to appear in court as required by the conditions of 
his release ("bail jumping"), in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 3146. 
 
Muhammad was tried before a jury on all three counts. 
Prior to trial, he offered to plead guilty to the bail jumping 
count. The government rejected the offer, informing 
Muhammad that its policy was not to accept a plea to one 
count of an indictment if it was required to pursue at trial 
other counts to which a defendant would not plead. On the 
first day of the trial, however, the district court informed 
Muhammad that it would accept his guilty plea regardless 
of the government's policy. The court also ruled that it 
would allow the government to offer proof of the bail 
jumping, even if Muhammad pleaded guilty to the charge, 
as evidence of "consciousness of guilt" on thefirearms 
charges. As a result of this ruling, Muhammad asserts, he 
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decided not to enter a guilty plea since the plea would not 
have affected the evidence against him. 
 
At trial, Muhammad did not actively dispute the bail 
jumping charge. He testified as to the facts of his bail 
jumping and did not cross-examine the government's 
witnesses on this issue. He testified that he failed to appear 
because he was scared and did not believe that he would 
receive a fair trial on the gun possession charge due to his 
criminal record. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the 
bail jumping charge, but was unable to reach a verdict on 
the two firearms charges and, ultimately, a mistrial was 
declared. A second trial on those counts also resulted in a 
deadlock and a mistrial. In the wake of this second mistrial, 
the district court granted the government's motion to 
dismiss the two firearms charges. 
 
The district court sentenced Muhammad pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6, which is the applicable guideline for bail 
jumping. Section 2J1.6 provides for a base offense level of 
six for all failures to appear that are not failures to appear 
for reporting for service of a sentence. See U.S.S.G. 
S 2J1.6(a)(2). This base offense level is then enhanced in 
proportion to the statutory maximum penalty authorized for 
the "underlying offense" which is defined as "the offense in 
respect to which the defendant failed to appear." U.S.S.G. 
S 2J1.6 cmt. 1. Specifically, the guideline provides in 
relevant part that if: 
 
       the underlying offense is -- 
 
       (A) punishable by death or imprisonment for a term 
       of fifteen years or more, increase by 9 levels; or 
 
       (B) punishable by a term of imprisonment of five 
       years or more, but less than fifteen years, increase 
       by 6 levels . . . 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6(b)(2). The district court elevated 
Muhammad's base offense level by nine points pursuant to 
S 2J1.6(b)(2)(A) since it determined that the indictment's 
reference to 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) constituted notice to 
Muhammad at the time he jumped bail of the government's 
intent to seek a punishment of at least fifteen years if he 
were convicted under S 922(g)(1).3  Muhammad now appeals 
that determination. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. At sentencing, neither the parties nor the court referred to Count 2 of 
the original indictment, which charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(k). 
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The district court had jurisdiction over this federal 
criminal case under 28 U.S.C. S 3231. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. S 3742. 
 
II. 
 
Application of U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6 is, as a general matter, 
straightforward: the defendant's base offense level is set by 
the guideline, and is then increased, according to clear 
rules, in proportion to what the defendant's "underlying 
offense" was "punishable by." Since the defendant's 
"underlying offense" can be found by looking to the 
indictment and the maximum statutory penalty associated 
with that offense by reference to the United States Code, 
there is usually little room for error. But this case deviates 
from the norm, for the underlying offense with which 
Muhammad was charged, 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1), has two 
penalty provisions associated with it, and thus in order to 
calculate his sentence for bail jumping, we must first 
decide the proper method for determining what an 
underlying offense is "punishable by" in such a situation.4 
This question is one we have not previously had occasion to 
address. 
 
A. 
 
Muhammad contends that the phrase "punishable by" 
should be interpreted to require that the defendant in fact 
be subject to the penalty provision. Thus, he contends that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Presumably, this is because S 922(k) offenses are punishable by prison 
terms of up to only five years. See 18 U.S.C. S 924(a)(1)(B). While 
U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6(b)(2) does not explicitly instruct courts to look to the 
underlying offense with the highest available punishment when a 
defendant jumps bail with respect to more than one crime punishable by 
different terms, such an approach is sensible, and Muhammad does not 
challenge it here. 
 
4. Muhammad was charged in Count 1 of his indictment with violations 
of both 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) and S 924(e). Since the latter provision is 
a 
sentencing enhancement provision, rather than a substantive offense, 
see United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 1987), the 
underlying offense that Muhammad faced was S 922(g)(1). 
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the district court should not have been permitted to look to 
S 924(e) in determining his sentence since, even had he 
been convicted on the S 922(g)(1) charge, he would not have 
actually qualified for sentencing under S 924(e) because he 
did not have the requisite number and type of qualifying 
convictions. While the government contests Muhammad's 
assertion that he would not have qualified for sentencing 
under S 924(e), it also argues that such a determination is 
irrelevant to Muhammad's sentence for bail jumping. We 
agree. Muhammad's view, in addition to being fraught with 
practical difficulties,5 is foreclosed by the text of U.S.S.G. 
S 2J1.6, which makes clear that a defendant's bail jumping 
sentence should be increased in relation to the potential 
punishment that he faced at the time he jumped bail rather 
the actual punishment that he received. See United States 
v. Sanchez, 995 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1993) (Section 2J1.6 
not rendered unreasonable by the fact that it requires the 
district court to enhance the base offense level according to 
the maximum sentence for the underlying offense, without 
regard for the possibility that the defendant might actually 
receive a sentence of less than the statutory maximum).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Whether the S 924(e) enhancement applies is often a complex question 
that requires the district court to sift through a great deal of evidence. 
In addition, the decision to apply the enhancement is often appealed to 
this Court. The practical difficulties are particularly apparent in a case 
such as this one where the defendant was never convicted of the 
underlying S 922(g)(1) offense and the question of whether S 924(e) 
actually applied never arose. Since, as a general matter, no one can say 
with any degree of certainty what penalties will be imposed prior to the 
drafting of a presentence report and the holding of a sentencing hearing, 
adoption of Muhammad's approach would require the court to conduct 
an extended, mock sentencing procedure on counts for which no 
conviction has, or indeed may ever be, obtained. 
 
6. See also United States v. Kincaid, 959 F.2d 54, 56-57 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(using maximum possible sentence to compute S 2J1.6 enhancement is 
not arbitrary and capricious though probable sentence based on 
guidelines is much lower); United States v. Williams, 932 F.2d 1515 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) (upholding enhancement based on maximum sentence of 
original underlying offense, although Williams was convicted only of 
misdemeanor); United States v. Harper, 932 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(approving enhancement based on possible sentence although defendant 
had already received a much lower sentence before failure to appear); 
United States v. Agbai, 930 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1991) (approving 
enhancement based on five year maximum although Agbai had received 
two concurrent ten-month sentences). 
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Indeed, a defendant need not be convicted of the underlying 
offense in order for S 2J1.6(b)(2) to apply. See United States 
v. Williams, 932 F.2d 1515, 1516-17 (D.C. Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Nelson, 919 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 
Muhammad also argues that where an underlying offense 
is punishable by both a generic penalty provision and a 
heightened penalty provision, only the generic provision 
should be counted for purposes of sentencing under the 
bail jumping guideline. Thus, he submits that since his 
underlying offense, 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1), is as a generic 
matter (i.e. without the S 924(e) enhancement), punishable 
by a prison term of no more than ten years, see 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(a)(2), only the six point enhancement under U.S.S.G. 
S 2J1.6(b)(2)(B) should be applicable. Again, Muhammad's 
argument ignores the fact that S 2J1.6(b)(2) explicitly 
directs the district court to determine the proper 
enhancement by reference to what the defendant's 
underlying offense is potentially "punishable by." 
Muhammad does not contest that, at least in certain 
circumstances, a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) is 
punishable by the 15 year minimum found in 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(e). 
 
B. 
 
Having rejected the approaches advanced by Muhammad, 
we are left with the question of how to construe the phrase 
"punishable by." The government offers both a "categorical" 
and a "notice-based" approach to the application of 
U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6 where the underlying offense is associated 
with more than one penalty provision. Under the categorical 
approach, the phrase "punishable by" is interpreted as 
referring to the highest of any and all statutory penalties, 
regardless of the particular circumstances presented by 
individual cases. Thus, every defendant charged with a 
S 922(g)(1) offense would be said to face a potential penalty 
of life-imprisonment under S 924(e) for purposes of U.S.S.G. 
S 2J1.6(b)(2), since that maximum is higher than the 
alternative ten year maximum in S 922(a)(2). 
 
This categorical approach is, in essence, an extension of 
the approach taken where the underlying offense has a 
single penalty provision, and it comports with the 
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requirement that the defendant's bail jumping sentence be 
increased in proportion to the potential punishment that he 
faced when he jumped bail. Nonetheless, we reject it since 
its adoption would undermine a fundamental assumption 
that serves to rationalize the bail jumping guideline's tiered 
enhancement structure -- that, at the time the defendant 
fled, he was aware of the potential penalty that he faced. 
 
In Sanchez, supra, we rejected a challenge to the 
reasonableness of the guideline, concluding that: 
 
       In our view, the bail jumping guideline is eminently 
       reasonable in that it takes into account the likelihood 
       that a defendant who is facing a more serious charge 
       with a longer possible jail term has a greater incentive 
       to flee than a defendant facing a less serious charge 
       with a shorter possible jail term. As the D.C. Circuit 
       noted in United States v. Williams, 932 F.2d 1515, 
       1517 (D.C. Cir. 1991), absent this enhancement 
       structure, "the penalty for failure to appear will not 
       provide an accused with sufficient incentive to face the 
       judicial music." 
 
995 F.2d at 469-70 (citation omitted). As the Sanchez panel 
recognized, the tiered enhancement structure set forth in 
S 2J1.6(b)(2) is predicated on the fact that there is a logical 
relationship between the length of a possible sentence on a 
charged offense and the length of the sentence imposed for 
evading a court appearance for that offense. This 
relationship arises from the fact that the more serious the 
potential punishment faced by a defendant, the more 
serious his punishment for jumping bail on that offense 
should be in order adequately to deter him. This deterrence 
rationale is, in turn, founded on the concept of notice since, 
in order for the "greater incentive to flee" to be more than 
theoretical, the defendant must have been at least 
constructively aware of the potential punishment associated 
with his underlying offense at the time he jumped bail. 
 
Of course, neither the Sanchez panel nor the guideline 
explicitly mentions notice. Where the defendant's 
underlying offense is punishable by a single penalty 
provision, the listing of that offense in the indictment 
provides the defendant with constructive notice of the 
 
                                9 
  
maximum penalty that he faces. But in cases such as the 
present one, in which more than one penalty provision 
exists for a given offense, simply indicting the defendant on 
the underlying charge will not provide him with any notice 
as to whether the government is seeking application of the 
heightened penalty provision. 
 
The centrality of the concept of notice to the rationality of 
the enhancement structure of U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6 leads us to 
conclude that where more than one penalty provision is 
associated with an offense, in order to trigger a penalty for 
purposes of the phrase "punishable by" as used in 
S 2J1.6(b)(2), the government must notify the defendant 
that it will seek that penalty provision prior to the time the 
defendant jumps bail, whether by way of indictment or 
otherwise.7 Where the government fails to invoke any 
penalty provision, it will be assumed, for purposes of the 
bail jumping guideline, that it has chosen to pursue the 
provision which carries the lesser maximum penalty. It is 
only by placing this limited burden on the government that 
we can be certain that a defendant such as Muhammad 
was at least constructively aware that the government 
intended to seek a heightened penalty when he jumped 
bail, and thereby ensure that application of the bail 
jumping guideline in such cases remains faithful to the 
notice principle underpinning its proportional enhancement 
structure. 
 
C. 
 
Applying this "notice" approach to Muhammad, we find 
that since he was informed by the government in his 
indictment that it intended to seek the 18 U.S.C.S 924(e) 
sentencing enhancement, the district court was entitled to 
enhance his base offense level for bail jumping by nine 
levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2J1.6(b)(2)(A). In reaching this 
conclusion, we reject Muhammad's argument that it is 
unfair to apply the notice-based approach in this case since 
the government's decision to seek the S 924(e) enhancement 
was so baseless that he did not actually believe at the time 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The government informs us that it often alleges the applicability of 
S 924(e) in a separate notice. 
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that he fled that he would, in fact, qualify for the 
enhancement. 
 
While we can imagine that there may be some point at 
which the government's notice that it intends to seek a 
penalty enhancement such as S 924(e) would be so baseless 
as to make it unfair to permit the defendant's sentence to 
be enhanced under S 2J1.6, this is not such a case. The 
record reveals that the government had a plausible basis 
for seeking the enhancement.8 Further, to the extent that 
Muhammad is arguing that application of the bail jumping 
guideline requires a subjective inquiry into the defendant's 
state of mind when he fled, we reject this argument. The 
bail jumping guideline rests on a presumption that a 
defendant's decision to flee is predicated, at least in part, 
on the severity of the penalty that the government intends 
to seek. While this presumption may not prove true in every 
case, it is certainly rational, and we see nothing in either 
the language of the guideline nor its underlying principles 
that suggests that the defendant's subjective state of mind 
is in any way relevant to the guideline's application. 
 
III. 
 
Muhammad also challenges the district court's refusal to 
award him a reduction in his sentence based on acceptance 
of responsibility. Under the sentencing guidelines, a 
defendant is entitled to a two-level reduction to his 
calculated offense level if he "clearly demonstrates 
acceptance of responsibility for his offense." U.S.S.G. 
S 3E1.1(a). We review a district court's factual 
determination with respect to acceptance of responsibility 
under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. 
Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1 cmt. 5 ("The sentencing judge is in a 
unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of 
responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the 
sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review."). 
The defendant bears the burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We leave for another day the question of what remedy would be 
appropriate where the government had no basis to seek a penalty 
enhancement such as 18 U.S.C. S 924(e). 
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sentence reduction. See United States v. Rodriquez, 975 
F.2d 999, 1008 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
The reduction for acceptance of responsibility generally 
does not apply to a defendant "who puts the government to 
its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual 
elements of guilt, is convicted and only then admits guilt 
and expresses remorse." U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1, cmt. 2. However, 
in "rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an 
acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even 
though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial." Id. 
Such a situation 
 
       may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial 
       to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to 
       factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to 
       a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute 
       to his conduct). In each such instance, however, a 
       determination that a defendant has accepted 
       responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial 
       statements and conduct. 
 
Id. 
 
The district court based its decision to deny Muhammad 
the reduction on its conclusion that "nothing in 
Muhammad's pretrial conduct . . . amounts to an 
affirmative acceptance of responsibility." Rather, the court 
found that Muhammad had engaged in "some tactical 
maneuvering" to gain a benefit (non-admission of the 
evidence related to the bail jumping offense) in return for a 
guilty plea. The court also found that, by going to trial, 
Muhammad "presented the government not only with the 
need to prove its case, but also with the risk of jury 
nullification."9 
 
Muhammad directs his arguments on this appeal almost 
exclusively to refuting the district court's conclusions that 
he forced the government to prove its case and that there 
was a risk of nullification. We do not address these 
arguments, or the government's forceful responses, since 
they miss the essential basis of the district court's decision. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The government views Muhammad's statement to the jury that he fled 
because he was "scared" as a plea for jury sympathy. 
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That is, even were we to conclude that Muhammad did not 
actively contest his guilt, and that he in no way courted 
nullification, he still would not be entitled to the reduction 
absent a showing that he affirmatively accepted 
responsibility for his conduct. See e.g. United States v. 
Portillo-Valenzeula, 20 F.3d 393, 394 (10th Cir. 1994) ("the 
question is not whether [the defendant] actively asserted 
his innocence but whether he `clearly demonstrate[d]' 
acceptance of his guilt.") (quoting U.S.S.G.S 3E1.1(a)). 
Clearly demonstrating acceptance of responsibility requires 
a genuine show of contrition. See United States v. Royer, 
895 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 
The only evidence of remorse that Muhammad directs us 
to is that he offered to plead guilty and that he took the 
stand and admitted the essential facts underlying the bail- 
jumping charge. As to the latter, we see nothing in 
Muhammad's testimony that amounts to an affirmative 
statement of remorse or contrition, and we refuse to so 
conclude as a matter of law on the basis that Muhammad, 
once he waived his fifth amendment privilege, fulfilled his 
obligation not to perjure himself. As to Muhammad's 
arguments regarding his offer to plead guilty, we see no 
basis for disturbing the district court's conclusion that 
Muhammad's offer amounted to "tactical maneuvering." 
This is especially true in light of the fact that the district 
court specifically informed Muhammad that he could plead 
guilty without the government's consent, and thus, had 
Muhammad truly been remorseful, nothing prevented him 
from pleading guilty to the bail jumping charge. 
 
After reviewing the record, we find nothing in the facts 
that leads us to conclude that the district court clearly 
erred in determining that this was not one of the "rare 
instances" in which an acceptance of responsibility 
reduction is warranted despite the defendant's decision to 
go to trial. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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